Abstract. Aiming at the phenomenon that peers provide various data services to each other in the real network, a service model system consisting of three sub-models is constructed. In order to encourage a peer to provide more services to other peers, a new reciprocator incentive policy is proposed, which improves the robustness of the service model system. The experiment results and analysis show that this model system can simulate the phenomenon of interconnect peers providing services to each other, and can be used for reference to improve the service level.
Introduction
In the real network, peers have various requirements of data services from other peers, such as requesting data transmission, data storage, file sharing and so on. If the peers are willing to provide services to each other, the network has good robustness. If the peers are unwilling to provide services for other peers, the number of times that the network peers provide services to each other will be reduced, which will affect the robustness of the network and even lead to the termination of network service.
In view of the above problems, some scholars have carried out researches, and have drawn some useful conclusions. For example, the micropayment method is proposed in reference [1] [2] that peers can obtain revenue through providing services, so as to motivate the peers to continuously provide services. The incentives based on reputation is proposed in reference [3] [4] [5] that peers calculate the reputation value according to the historical behavior of neighbors, and then decide their behavior towards neighbors. Reference [6] [7] models peers and their interactions based on evolutionary game theory, and analyzes the robustness of the system with incentive policy. This paper proposes a service model system based on scale-free network. The model system is composed of three parts: network sub model, service sub model and learning sub model. On this basis, a new reciprocator incentive policy is proposed.
Simulation experiment and analysis show that compared with the existing model system, our model system is closer to the real situation, and can simulate the real network peers serving each other and transforming each other. The new reciprocator incentive policy based on the model system can guarantee the continuous service between network peers. Even when there are many defectors at the beginning, the robustness of the network system can still be achieved.
Service Model System
On the basis of reference [8] , we construct a service model system closer to the real environment. The model consists of three parts: network sub model, service sub model and learning sub model (see Table. 1). They are introduced as follows:
1. Network sub model. This sub-model is based on scale-free network model. Most of the general research models use complete peer-to-peer networks. The research method is relatively simple, but there is a big gap with the real network. Therefore, the conclusions drawn from the research will be deviated from the real situation to some extent. This paper adopts scale-free network as the basic network sub model, which is an important change of the network model system compared with other model systems. At the same time, for the convenience of research and without loss of generality, the closed and discrete characteristics of the network are still retained.
2. Service sub model. This sub-model is based on game theory. Matrix model has the following characteristics: (1) we can define an nn  generosity matrix G with ()
gj denote the probability that a type i peer will provide service to a type j peer. In this paper, there are three types of peers with values of 1, 2 and 3, respectively corresponding types for cooperators, reciprocators and defectors.
N represents the number of peer types in the service model. (2)At the beginning of each time slot, each peer in the network randomly selects another peer connected to it in the system and requests services. (3) The selected peer may or may not provide services to the requesting peer. Whether or not to provide services depends on the type of the selected peer and the current strategy adopted by the selected peer. (4) At each time slot, when a peer receives a service from another peer, it will obtain a certain number of points, that is, revenue value. When a peer provides services to other peers, it will pay a certain number of points, that is, consumption value. In order to facilitate comparison, we uniformly stipulate that the consumption value of a peer providing services to other peers is 1.
3. Learning sub model. This sub-model is based on Current-best Learning Model. The model includes three parts:
(1) Let i payoff denote the average revenue of type i peers at a given time slot.
i payoff can be expressed as:
In above expression, N represents the total number of i -type peers in the model system at the current time step. Let h payoff denotes the type with the highest average revenue of this round. That is ,
(2) Let i P denote the probability that type i peers will switch to other type peers.
i P can be expressed as follows:
In above expression, a  is the adaptation rate, and s  is the sensitivity.
(3) The complete process in a time slot is described as follows: 1. Each peer ( i ) randomly selects a peer ( j ) from its own set of connected peers to request services and provide its own peer type;
2. The peer ( j ) receiving the service request makes a decision based on the peer type and its current strategy;
3. Each peer calculates its own revenue of this round and notifies the system its revenue value; 4. The system classifies and sums up the revenue value of each peer, calculates the average revenue (formula 1). Then, it obtains the strategy with the highest average revenue of this round (formula 2), and notifies each peer in the system the type of the strategy and the revenue value;
5. Each peer compares its own strategy type with the highest strategy. If the same, the strategy will be maintained; if the different, it will turn to step 6.
6. The peer compares its revenue with the average maximum revenue. If the revenue of the peer is higher than the average maximum payoff or the same, the strategy remains unchanged. Otherwise, it turns to step 7.
7. Calculate the probability according to formula (3) , and the peers change the strategy according to the probability.
A New Reciprocator Incentive Policy
In the reciprocator incentive policy, there are three types of peers: co-operator, reciprocators and defectors. The innovation of the reciprocator incentive policy proposed in this paper is that the incentive strategy adopted by the reciprocator is different from other reciprocator incentive policy. In other reciprocator incentive policy, the reciprocators generally serves the cooperators. In our reciprocity strategy, the probability that a reciprocator provides for a cooperator depends on the proportion of the reciprocators in the system. Compared with other reciprocators, the reciprocator proposed in this paper is more wise, so the reciprocator incentive policy proposed in this paper is named as the wise incentive policy.
The wise incentive policy can be expressed in matrix model. Specifically, w G represents the wise incentive strategy matrix, and () i gj represents the probability that type i peer provides services to type j peer. For example,   2 1 g represents the probability that the wiser provides services to the cooperator. The details are as follows:
In above matrix,
f is a constructed probability function of the wiser providing service for the cooperator.  is the revenue value greater than 1. The meaning of the function is that the probability of the wiser serving the cooperator is determined by the product of the proportion of the wisers and the difference of revenues, and the maximum is no more than 1. 2 x represents the proportion of the wisers in the system. In addition, 1 x and 3 x respectively represent the proportion of the cooperators and defectors in the system, which will be used in the following paragraphs.
Simulation Experiment and Analysis

(1) Experiment setting
In order to verify the authenticity of the model system and the effectiveness of the wise incentive policy, we carried out simulation experiments. According to reference [10] , we set the number of network peers to be 500, and the other related initial parameters are the same. Specific experimental parameters are set as follows: The wise incentive policy is compared with the other two reciprocator incentive policies, which are mirror incentive policy and proportional incentive policy respectively. Two groups of initial peers with different proportion are designed, and the value of  is 3 and 7, respectively. Thus, four groups of experiments are completed by pair-wise comparison as Table 3 . Table 3 . The parameters of four experiments.
Group
Initial proportion ( 1 2 3 ,, (2) Experimental results and analysis The scale-free network is firstly generated. Then, experimental parameters are initialized, including the respective strategies of the three types of peers. In each group, three policies are 20 times, and it runs 3000 time steps in each time. The average of the proportions of defectors in the total peers in the last 500 steps is used to measure whether the system is available. At the same time, the mean variance of the proportions of defectors in the total peers in the last 500 steps is calculated as an indicator of whether the system is robust or not. Fig.1 -Fig.4 show the situations after the operation of 1-4 groups of experiments. In the above figures, the vertical axis represents the proportion of defectors in the total peers in the system, and the horizontal axis represents the number of runs. The upper and lower widths of peers are the magnitude of mean variance. The larger the width, the greater the mean variance. In other words, the number of peers in the last 500 steps has a relatively large fluctuation.
According to the analysis in Fig.1-Fig.4 , the following results can be obtained: (1) the four experimental results of mirror incentive policy and proportional incentive policy in this paper are basically consistent with those in reference [9] . It indicates that our model system achieves a good simulation. (2) in a group of 20 experiments, the experimental results of mirror incentive policy and proportional incentive policy sometimes show large fluctuations, while it is not found in reference [9] . The reason lies in the fact that different network models are adopted at the bottom of this paper and reference [9] . Reference [9] is based on the complete graph network, and this paper is based on scale-free network. In scale-free network, once the more peers become defectors, it will have a great impact on the whole system. But it will not happen in the complete graph network. Because scalefree network is closer to real network, the experimental results in this paper are more real. (3) the wise incentive policy in four cases all show good robustness. The reason is that in the wise incentive policy, it will suppresses or even punish cooperators, rather than encouraging cooperators, when the initial defectors is more. Therefore, we can indirectly inhibit or punish defectors, so as to make sure that the most profitable peer in the system is always the wiser, leading to other peers to become the wisers.
Conclusion
This paper constructs and implements a service model system based on scale-free network. To solve the problem that the system with too many defectors at the beginning gradually loses its robustness, the wise incentive policy is proposed. Experimental simulation and analysis show that the model system can not only simulate the service between the network peers, but also maintain the robustness by using the wise incentive policy.
However, in order to facilitate the study of the proposed model, the scale-free network is generated before the simulation experiment. How to carry out simulation research under the dynamic environment, that is, the network scale is constantly expanding or peers are constantly joining or exiting, is the next topic.
